Law Review Article on Saint Francis College V Al-khazraji

• Scan cases
• U.s. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
• 1986
• March
• AL-KHAZRAJI 5. SAINT FRANCIS COLLEGE

• AL-KHAZRAJI v. SAINT FRANCIS COLLEGE United states of america Court of Appeals, Tertiary Circuit. (Mar 3, 1986) Mar 3, 1986
• Subsequent
  References
• CaseIQ^TM
  (AI Recommendations)

784 F.2d 505

Important Paras

• In particular, directors, officers, and employees of a corporation may become personally liable when they intentionally crusade an infringement of rights protected past Section 1981, regardless of whether the corporation may also be held liable. See Tillman five. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, 517 F.2d 1141, 1146 (fourth Cir. 1975); Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956, 959 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 422 U.Due south. 1006, 95 S.Ct. 2627, 45 L.Ed.2d 669 (1975); See also Weaver v. Gross, 605 F. Supp. 210, 212-thirteen (D.D.Col. 1985); Gladden v. Barry, 558 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D.D.Col. 1983); Jeter 5. Boswell, 554 F. Supp. 946, 951-53 (N.D.West.Va. 1983).Go to
• If individuals are personally involved in the bigotry confronting the Appellant, and if they intentionally caused the College to infringe on Appellant's Section 1981 rights, or if they authorized, directed, or participated in the alleged discriminatory deport, they may exist held liable. Come across Manuel 5. International Harvester Company, 502 F. Supp. 45 (N.D.Sick. 1980); Coley 5. M M Mars, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1073 (G.D.Ga. 1978); see also Sullivan 5. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236-37, 90 S.Ct. 400, 404, 24 50.Ed.2d 386 (Section 1982 suit permitted confronting corporation and its directors).Go to
• Just a few months after Al-Khazraji was informed of the Tenure Commission's conclusion, the Third Circuit, in Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1978), fabricated information technology absolutely clear that the six-year limitations flow for contract actions practical to Section 1981 actions brought to redress employment discrimination. See Liotta 5. National Forge Company, 629 F.second 903, 906 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.Southward. 970, 101 Due south.Ct. 2046, 68 L.Ed.2d 348 (1981); Skehan v. Lath of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Higher, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied 444 U.South. 832, 100 Southward.Ct. 61, 62 50.Ed.2nd 41 (1979). Thus, unlike the country of the constabulary regarding the proper limitations period for Section 1983 actions, in early 1978 the precedents were sufficiently clear that Al-Khazraji could reasonably accept relied upon them when deciding to filibuster filing his Section 1981 claim. Compare Smith v. Metropolis of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1985).Go to
• This Circuit, from at least 1977 until 1985, had applied Pennsylvania'due south vi-year statute of limitations in discrimination cases brought under Department 1981. Run into Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Buying Association, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corporation, 549 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977). Judge Ziegler, in his stance below, properly applied the half-dozen-twelvemonth limitations period to plaintiff's merits. Neither he nor this court foresaw the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Wilson v. Garcia, ___ U.Due south. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). See Goodman v. Lukens Steel, 777 F.second 113, 118 (3d Cir. 1985).Go to
• An individual, including a director, officer, or agent of a corporation, may be liable for injuries suffered by tertiary parties because of his torts, regardless of whether he acted on his ain business relationship or on behalf of the corporation. "An officer of a corporation who takes role in the commission of a tort past the corporation is personally liable therefore." Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 275-76 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 988, 88 S.Ct. 1183, 19 Fifty.Ed.2d 1291 (1968). See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 343 (1957).Go to
• We have already decided that retroactive application of Goodman would defeat the reasonable expectations of those, like Al-Khazraji, who relied upon the Davis line of cases. "[I]t would produce the most `substantial inequitable results' to hold that [Appellant] `slept on his rights' at a fourth dimension when he could not have known the time limitation that the police imposed on him." Chevron, 404 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. at 356 (citation omitted). Al-Khazraji's position is fifty-fifty more compelling. In 1981, because the commune courtroom applied the clear pre- Goodman rule, Al-Khazraji survived defendants' movement to dismiss the Section 1981 claims as untimely under a ii-year statute of limitations. 523 F. Supp. at 386. If Gauge Ziegler had ruled differently so dismissed the pendent state claims, Al-Khazraji perhaps would not have permitted the state court non pros to be entered. Retroactive application of Goodman would probably compel dismissal of those pendent claims, every bit Department 1981 is the merely federal crusade of activity left to Al-Khazraji. Yet, information technology may be too late for Al-Khazraji to rescue his state lawsuit. Because we cannot say whether Pennsylvania would let him to reinstate that adapt in country courtroom, it seems possible that this might forestall him from litigating those claims. This seems to be a harsh result.Become to
• This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants below. Appellant, Majid Ghaidan Al-Khazraji, alleges that he, a U.Southward. citizen, was denied tenure at St. Francis College on business relationship of his race, faith, and national origin. On appeal, appellant'southward case is premised on Title VII, 42 UsC. § 1981 and pendent land law claims. We affirm the district court as to the Title VII merits, and reverse as to the Section 1981 and pendent claims. Go to
• The first Chevron factor requires that the prior law have been sufficiently clear that the plaintiff could have reasonably relied upon it in delaying suit. Fitzgerald v. Larson, 769 F.2d at 163. In 1973, when the complaint was filed in the Goodman instance, there was no established precedent in the Tertiary Circuit to indicate the appropriate limitations period for Section 1981 claims. However, when the cause of action in Al-Khazraji's example arose, in early 1978, this was no longer true.Become to
• The 1978 alter in the Pennsylvania law does not bear upon this conclusion. Effective June 27, 1978, a new statute of limitations went into effect in Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.Southward. Section 5527, which set forth a six-twelvemonth limitations period for actions upon a contract, did not modify the limitations menstruation applicable under the prior law. 12 P.Due south. Department 31 (repealed). Every bit Gauge Ziegler noted beneath, there was zero in the change to advise that Pennsylvania intended that a shorter limitations catamenia be substituted for the half-dozen-year period that formerly had practical to actions for alienation of employment. 523 F. Supp. at 389-ninety; Encounter Ulloa 5. Metropolis of Philadelphia, 95 F.R.D. 109, 114 (East.D.Pa. 1982).Go to
• While the distinction between racial bigotry, which is cognizable under Section 1981, and other types of discrimination, which may not be cognizable, may in some instances be obscure, that cannot justify refusing to endeavor the distinction. Discrimination based on race seems, at a minimum, to involve discrimination directed confronting an individual because he or she is genetically role of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of human sapiens. Go to
• The commune court was correct. Plaintiff'south First Complaint, pro se, at Paragraph 7, alleges that "[defendants'] unlawful employment policy and practice consisted of refusing to renew the total-fourth dimension kinesthesia appointment of Majid G. Al-Khazraji, Ph.D., considering of national origin, religion and/or race. . . ." Paragraph viii alleges that defendants' acquit has deprived plaintiff of "equal employment opportunity and otherwise adversely affect[ed] his status as an employee because of his national origin, religion, and/or race." Plaintiff's second amended complaint, pro se, at Paragraph seven alleges that "[Defendants are] depriving him of his Civil Rights . . . because of his national origin (Iraq), religion (Muslim) and/or race (Arabian)." The plaintiff'due south third complaint, which raised the Department 1981 accuse, did non repeat the allegation of racial motivation. Withal, as Guess Ziegler observed, "[a]lthough the exact word `race' may not appear in plaintiff's third complaint, which raised the claim under 42 UsaC. § 1981, plaintiff's position from the outset has been that he was subject to disparate treatment because of `national origin, faith, and/or race.' We therefore turn down to dismiss plaintiff'southward activity nether Section 1981 simply because he omitted the word `race' in his 3rd complaint. In our view, it is a technical defect of piffling significance. The thrust of plaintiff's claims, namely, that he was denied tenure past St. Francis College because he is an Arabian built-in in Iraq, is clear to all concerned . . ." 523 F. Supp. at 391-92.Go to
• On November 28, 1984, defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining issues in the instance. On March 12, 1985, Estimate Mencer granted summary judgment for defendants. Judge Mencer held that Al-Khazraji had not made out a prima facie case under Section 1981 because, since 1978, the only other person to receive tenure in the Department of Behavioral Science at St. Francis was Al-Khazraji's wife. Additionally, Judge Mencer held that a claim of bigotry on the footing of existence an Arab is not cognizable under Department 1981.Get to
• The Rules of Decision Act, 28 UsC. § 1652 requires federal courts to give a prior state court judgment the same res judicata upshot as would be provided past the courts of that land. Migra v. Warren City School District, 465 U.S. 75, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 Fifty.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Ligas 5. City of Pittsburgh, 765 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1985). Appellees argue that Al-Khazraji's suit in federal court is res judicata because of the prior land court and PHRC deportment filed by Al-Khazraji. Neither contention is persuasive.Go to
• Although there were some earlier cases that borrowed a shorter limitations period for Section 1981 deportment, see Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corporation, 399 F. Supp. 403 (West.D.Pa. 1975), rev'd 549 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977); Davis v. United States Steel Supply Visitor, 405 F. Supp. 394 (Due west.D.Pa. 1976), rev'd 581 F.2nd 335 (3d Cir. 1978); Presseisen v. Swarthmore Higher, 71 F.R.D. 34 (Eastward.D.Pa 1976), by 1977 the district courts were uniformly applying the six-year limitations flow for actions alleging interference with contractual rights. See Collier, 441 F. Supp. at 1212; Groves 5. Insurance Company of North America, 433 F. Supp. 877, 884 (E.D.Pa. 1977); Pierce v. Catalytic, Inc., 430 F. Supp. at 1182; see besides Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corporation, 383 F. Supp. 420, 430-31 (E.D.Pa 1974).Go to
• The 3rd Chevron factor is whether retroactive awarding will reach harsh, unjust, or inequitable results. Fitzgerald, 769 F.second at 164. In Fitzgerald, Guess Sloviter observed that this factor overlaps with the first Chevron factor, for information technology would exist inequitable to requite retroactive application to a "shortening of the limitations period that altered established law upon which plaintiff could have reasonably relied." Id. Go to
• The Supreme Court, while it has often stated that Section 1981 exists to remedy racial discrimination, has never precisely defined its conception of "race." See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459-60, 95 Due south.Ct. at 1719-twenty; McDonald, 427 U.S. at 287, 96 South.Ct. at 2582; Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 Due south.Ct. at 2189; Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791, 86 Southward.Ct. 1783, 1789, 16 50.Ed.2d 925 (1966).Go to
• We believe that Congress'south purpose was to ensure that all persons be treated equally, without regard to colour or race, which we sympathise to embrace, at the to the lowest degree, membership in a grouping that is ethnically and physiognomically distinctive.Get to
• The commune court constitute that the individual defendants, who are members of the tenure commission, are non the employers of plaintiff and so cannot exist sued under Section 1981 or on the pendent state claims. We disagree. Although Department 1981 is a federal ceremonious rights remedy it is in the nature of a tort remedy. Goodman, 777 F.2d at 119-twenty.Go to
• We concord that because the private members of the tenure committee were not parties to any employment contract between Al-Khazraji and St. Francis Higher, they may not be sued on the contract for breach. However, Al-Khazraji has not alleged breach of contract against these individuals.Go to
• Judge Ziegler refused to view the Section 1981 merits equally raising merely a claim of discrimination based on national origin and not on race. Ziegler read Al-Khazraji'southward complaint as alleging that Al-Khazraji was denied tenure because he was of the "Arabian" race. He held that this could serve every bit the basis for a civil rights action under Section 1981. 523 F. Supp. at 391-92. Al-Khazraji's example thus went forrad based on Sections 1981, 1983, and the pendent state law claims.Go to
• The presumption that the holding of a case will be applied retroactively too as prospectively is merely a corollary of the principle that federal courts should apply the law in effect at the fourth dimension that cases are adjudicated. Gulf Offshore Company v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 453 U.Southward. 473, 486 n. 16, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2879 due north. 16, 69 Fifty.Ed.2d 784 (1981); Scott v. Local 863, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 725 F.2d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 1984).Get to
• Furthermore, Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, thirty L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), which discusses the criteria for deciding whether to except a item property from the presumption favoring retroactivity, favors retroactive awarding of Ricks. See Fitzgerald 5. Larson, 769 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1985); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.second 297 (1985). We need just discuss the start step of the Chevron analysis. In gild to justify nonretroactive application, the judicial determination must announce a new principle of police that either overrules clear past precedent or decides an issue of first impression whose resolution was non clearly foreshadowed. Chevron, 404 U.South. at 106-07, 92 Due south.Ct. at 355.Go to
• When evaluating the state of the prior law, information technology is necessary to look to the fourth dimension when the plaintiff's cause of activeness arose. If at that place is a clear precedent at that time upon which plaintiff might reasonably accept relied in delaying suit, it is unfair to overturn that reliance subsequently information technology is besides belatedly for the plaintiff to do anything almost it.Get to
• Because Section 1981 refers to no specific federal limitations period, federal courts are obligated to borrow the country limitations period which is applied to the state crusade of action well-nigh analogous to the civil rights cause of action, so long as information technology is not deleterious to the federal rights involved. Johnson five. Railway Limited Bureau, 421 U.S. 454, 464-65, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1722, 44 Fifty.Ed.2d 295 (1975); Run across Board of Regents 5. Tomanio, 446 U.Southward. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980); Swietlowich five. County of Bucks, 610 F.2nd 1157, 1162 (3d Cir. 1979).Go to
• Even so, Wilson five. Garcia has made it necessary for this court to re-examine its prior decisions. Consequently, in Goodman, we held that the Supreme Courtroom'due south ruling mandated that Pennsylvania'due south statute of limitations for personal injuries be applied to actions brought under Section 1981. This is a two-twelvemonth statute of limitations. 42 Pa.C.Southward.A. § 5524.Become to
• Chevron Oil Co. 5. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 Southward.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), sets forth the criteria for deciding whether to employ retroactively the holding of a case. Run into Fitzgerald five. Larson, 769 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1985); Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.) cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1985). Chevron requires the federal courts to undertake a 3-part analysis:Go to

• Outset, the conclusion to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either past overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may take relied, or by deciding an outcome of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that "nosotros must . . . counterbalance the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective performance volition further or retard its operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed past retrospective awarding, for [w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantially inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for fugitive the `injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity."

  Go to
• Wilson 5. Garcia, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 Fifty.Ed.2d 254 (1985), made the Goodman decision inevitable. In Smith v. City of Pittsburgh, 764 F.second 188 (3d Cir.) cert. denied ___ U.Due south. ___, 106 S.Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.second 297 (1985), we analyzed the purposes of Wilson and concluded that information technology was intended to promote uniformity and the minimization of unnecessary litigation. 764 F.2nd at 196. Smith found that the policies informing Wilson did non militate clearly either in favor of or against retroactive application. Id. Run into Fitzgerald v. Larsen, 769 F.2d at 164. The purposes of Goodman are the aforementioned as those of Wilson five. Garcia. Consequently, Goodman likewise is neutral in resolving this question.Go to
• Because we notice two of three Chevron factors present and the third neutral on this effect, we hold that, at least as to persons whose causes of action arose afterward 1977, Goodman should not be applied retroactively to change the applicable Pennsylvania statute of limitations from six to two years. Thus, Al-Khazraji's federal lawsuit, filed in 1980, was timely. Accord Elliott v. Grouping Medical and Surgical Care, 714 F.2d 556, 563 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.Southward. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2658, 81 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984) (New judge-made rules on limitations are usually not to be applied retroactively to a plaintiff who timely filed his complaint under the then-existing police of limitations).Go to

• All persons within the Jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same correct in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give bear witness, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to similar penalization, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

  Go to
• The Supreme Court has ruled that individuals who are not black, but who take been victims of racial discrimination can sue under Department 1981. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company, 427 U.S. 273, 96 Due south.Ct. 2574, 49 Fifty.Ed.2d 493 (1976). McDonald rejected the statement that Section 1981 is express to the protection of nonwhites against racial bigotry. 427 U.Due south. at 287-96, 96 S.Ct. at 2582-86. The protection against racial discrimination thus extends across those who are taxonomically members of the Negro race. Appellant is therefore not prevented from invoking Section 1981 merely because he is taxonomically classified equally a member of the Caucasian race. Compare LaFore v. Emblem Tape and Label Company, 448 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D.Col. 1978) (equating "white citizens" with a racial nomenclature is "utterly lacking in composure. In that location is no scientific justification for the equation."). Even so, the Supreme Court did not make articulate how the lower courts were to recognize the sort of discrimination proscribed by Department 1981. Therefore, we turn for guidance to the legislative history.Go to
• Section 1981 was originally enacted as part of Section one of the Civil Rights Deed of 1866, authorized by Section two of the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Because of doubts over Congress's authority to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866, it was subsequently reenacted following the adoption of the fourteenth amendment as Department xviii of the Civil Rights Deed of 1870, c. 114 Section 18, sixteen Stat. 144 (May 31, 1870). Meet Jones 5. United Gas Improvement Corporation, 68 F.R.D. ane, x-11 (East.D.Pa. 1975). Accordingly, Section 1981 has some ties to the fourteenth as well every bit to the thirteenth amendment. Croker v. Boeing Company, 662 F.2d 975 (3d Cir., 1981).Get to
• Accordingly, Al-Khazraji should be allowed the opportunity to testify that the discrimination he alleges is racially motivated inside the pregnant of Section 1981.Go to
• On October thirty, 1980, Al-Khazraji filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Courtroom for the Western Commune of Pennsylvania against St. Francis Higher. This complaint alleged violations of Championship 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.s.C. § 2000e et seq., by the higher. He subsequently secured counsel and filed amended complaints naming the members of the Tenure Committee as boosted defendants in their private and official capacities. The amended complaints added allegations that the defendants had violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(three), 1986, as well equally the Pennsylvania Human Relations Deed, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. Al-Khazraji also alleged breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law.Go to
• Al-Khazraji's state court action never proceeded to a judgment on the merits. Rather, pursuant to Cambria County Courtroom of Common Pleas Dominion of Court No. 33, the activity was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Pennsylvania courts requite no res judicata outcome to a dismissal for failure to prosecute. Encounter e.g., Robinson five. Trenton Dressed Poultry Co., 344 Pa. Super. 545, 496 A.2d 1240 (1985); Bon Homme Richard Restaurants, Inc. 5. Three Rivers Bank and Trust Company, 298 Pa. Super. 454, 444 A.2d 1272 (1982). Thus, the country court action is not res judicata to this suit.Go to
• The clearest example of the state of the law on this matter at the time Al-Khazraji'southward claim arose is the District Court opinion in Ricks, 22 BNA FEP Cases 788 (D.Del. 1978), motion for afterthought denied, 22 BNA FEP Cases 793 (D.Del. 1978), rev'd, 605 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) ( aff'k commune court). The district court approximate there found that Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Association, 559 F.second 894 (3d Cir. 1977), a case arising under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.Southward.C. § 3601 et seq. controlled. He read Meyers every bit leading to the determination that the alleged discriminatory acts at issue were the deprival of tenure and the honour of the concluding contract, non the subsequent termination of employment.Go to
• 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 Due south.Ct. at 355 (citations omitted).Go to
• Defendants next contend that Plaintiff may not sue nether Section 1981 because Arabs are not a "protected minority." They fence that an ethnic Arab is taxonomically a Caucasian and therefore "non a protected person under Section 1981 when he is presumably claiming other Caucasians or whites were improperly favored over him."Go to
• Cong.Earth at 1293.Become to
• See Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied science, Inc., 597 F.second 1298, 1300 (ninth Cir. 1979): "A substantial portion of the Mexican population traces its roots to a mixture of the Caucasian (Spanish) and Native American races. With this groundwork prejudice towards those of Mexican descent having a skin colour not characteristically Caucasian must be said to exist racial prejudice under 1981." But see Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1979). (Though Mexican Americans not technically another race, community attitudes differentiating Hispanics from "Anglos" are sufficient to bring care within Section 1981 because these attitudes are enough like racial prejudice.)Go to
• Because Al-Khazraji was unable to conduct full discovery prior to the defendants' move for summary judgment, we do not accept before us a sufficient record to determine whether he has been subjected to the sort of prejudice that Section 1981 would redress as being impermissibly racially-based. However, where a plaintiff comes into federal court and claims that he has been discriminated confronting because of his race, nosotros will not force him first to evidence his pedigree. Nosotros are unwilling to assert that Arabs cannot be the victims of racial prejudice: "prejudice is as irrational equally is the selection of groups confronting whom it is directed. It is thus a thing of practice or mental attitude in the community, it is a usage or image based on all the mistaken concepts of `race.'" Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (tenth Cir. 1979). Go to
• Other courts accept allowed "not-traditional" Section 1981 plaintiffs to heighten claims of race discrimination. See, e.g., Gonzalez five. Stanford Applied Engineering, 597 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff of Mexican descent having skin color "not characteristically Caucasian"); Banker 5. Fourth dimension Chemical, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1183 (Due north.D.Ill. 1983) (East Indian); Pollard five. City of Hartford, 539 F. Supp. 1156 (D.C.Conn. 1982) (Hispanic); Baruah five. Immature, 536 F. Supp. 356 (D.M.D. 1982) (Native of India having peel color not characteristically white); Aponte v. National Steel Service Center, 500 F. Supp. 198 (Northward.D.Ill. 1980) (Mexican-American); Tayyari five. New Mexico Country Academy, 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.K. 1980) (Iranian); Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F. Supp. 302 (Westward.D.North.Y. 1980) (Pakastani-American); Lopez 5. Sears, Roebuck Co. 493 F. Supp. 801 (D.M.D. 1980) (non-white (brown) Spanish surnamed Malay); Ridgeway five. Inter. Broth. of Elec. Wkrs. 466 F. Supp. 595 (Due north.D.Ill. 1979) (Hispanic); Cubas v. Rapid American Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663 (Eastward.D.Pa. 1976) (Cuban-American); Miranda v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 8 CCH EPD ¶ 9601, BNA FEP Cases 557 (D.N.J. 1974) (Puerto Rican). Compare Budinsky v. Corning Drinking glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.Pa. 1977) (plaintiff of Slavic national origin non able to state a cause of activity for race discrimination); Kurylas v. United States Dept. of Agronomics, 373 F. Supp. 1072 (D.D.C. 1974) aff'd 514 F.2d 894 (D.C.Cir. 1975) (aforementioned — Polish American).Get to
• All the same, we practise non concord that the individual defendants, simply because they were not Al-Khazraji'southward employer, cannot under any circumstances be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. This tort does not require contractual privity. Meet Bruffett five. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1982). Our understanding of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act leads us to the aforementioned determination regarding it. Encounter 43 P.S. §§ 955(eastward), 962(c).Go to
• The problem with this position is that it rests on a technical definition of race as black and white, or perhaps black, white and yellow, in keeping with the classic anthropological definition of race as the three major groups, Caucasoid, Negroid and Mongoloid. I hold with the console that there is no evidence that Congress intended a narrow scientific definition of race when it passed § 1981. Moreover, adopting an anthropological definition would pb to dissonant results: while a white would exist able to claim anti-white discrimination under the statute, for example, a Mexican-American or an Indian would be unable to make out a merits, unless they contended they were unfairly treated past virtue of being Caucasians.Go to
• Nevertheless it too leads to troubling results. Now, in any suit under § 1981, a jury may be asked to determine whether the plaintiff has been subjected to discrimination as a result of belonging to a grouping that is "ethnically and physiognomically distinctive" — a rather far cry from the language of, and the purpose behind, § 1981. Although the panel stops short of holding that national origin discrimination is encompassed by § 1981, near whatsoever nationality tin be seen as ethnically and physiognomically distinctive. The issue, I believe, constitutes a dramatic expansion in the number of plaintiffs who may now go on nether the statute, well beyond what Congress intended when it passed the police. In consequence, a statute aimed at racial bigotry is being converted into one besides focused on national origin discrimination.Become to

Read More than ...

This is a paid feature.
Please subscribe to download the judgment.

Fable

Size = Directly proportional to the number of citations

Color = Jurisdiction Supreme Courtroom High Courts Tribunals

Line Incoming = Cited by Outgoing = Cites

Use AI to go other relevant cases.

Copy Textarea

bancksexiony81.blogspot.com

Source: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914c26dadd7b049347bf853

Share this post